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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Statute of Frauds-The Main Purpose!Doctrine in North Carolina.
In determining whether or not an oral promise to answer for the
debt of another is within the statute of frauds' many courts have ap-
plied the "main purpose rule," the essence of which doctrine is that if
the promisor has a personal, immediate, and pecuniary interest in the
transaction in which a third party is the obligor, the promise is original
and not within the statute. This doctrine seems to have had its origin
in Massachusetts, 2 but the cases most frequently cited in support of it
are two decisions of the United States Supreme Court.3 This doctrine
has been accepted and applied in North Carolina. 4  Thus it has
been held in this state that the promisor's interest was sufficient to take
his oral promise out of the statute where he agreed to pay his grantor's
purchase money mortgage ;5 where he promised to pay a subcontractor
for hauling logs to his mill ;6 where he agreed to pay the creditor who
furnished a boiler to his contractor to be used in making slabs for use
in the promisor's business ;7 and where a bank president made an oral
guaranty of deposits, it appearing that the bank was on the verge of in-
solvency and that the promisor stood to lose heavily in that event.8
In a case where a group of citizens agreed to waive the provisions of a
tax assessment statute in order that a street might be improved, it was
held that the interest the leader of the group had in having the street
past his property improved was sufficient to take out of the statute of
frauds his promise to obtain waivers from the remainder of the adjoin-
ing owners, and he was held responsible for the payment by them.9
With the exception of this last case the principal debtor remained liable
in all of these cases.' 0
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §987 provides in substance that "no action
shall be brought . . . to charge any defendant on any special promise to answer
the debt, default, or miscarriage of another person unless the agreement on
which such action is brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in
writing, and signed by the party charged therewith or some other person there-
unto by him lawfully authorized."
2 Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Metc. 396, 37 Am. Dec. 148 (Mass. 1841) Chief Justice
Shaw, in discussing cases not within the statute, said, "where although the effect
of the promise is to pay the debt of another, yet the leading object of the under-
taker is to subserve some interest or purpose of his own, the promise is not within
the statute."
I Emerson v. Slater, 63 U. S. 28, 16 L. ed. 360 (1859) ; Davis v. Patrick, 141
U. S. 479, 12 Sup. Ct. 58, 35 L. ed. 826 (1891).
'Dale v. Gaither Lumber Co., 152 N. C. 651, 68 S. E. 134 (1910).
Coxe v. Dillard, 197 N. C. 344, 148 S. E. 545 (1929).
'Dale v. Gaither Lumber Co., 152 N. C. 651, 68 S. E. 134 (1910).
7 Kelly Handle Co. v. Crawford Mill Supply Co., 171 N. C. 495, 88 S. E.
514 (1916).
'Dillard v. Walker, 204 N. C. 16, 167 S. E. 636 (1933).
'City of Charlotte v. Alexander, 173 N. C. 515, 92 S. E. 384 (1917).
"The statute of frauds is no defense if there has been a release of a third
person in consideration of the promise. Shepherd v. Newton, 139 N. C. 533,
'52 S. E. 143 (1905) ; Jenkins v. 'Holley, 140 N. C. 379, 53 S. E. 237 (1906).
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The court, however, has not been altogether consistent in its applica-
tion of the rule. In a recent case it was indicated in a very strong dic-
tum that a person who is president, director, and stockholder of a cor-
poration does not have such an interest in the successful and profitable
operation of that corporation as to take his oral promise to answer for
its debt out of the statute of frauds." In an opinion filed on the same
day it was held that the interest of one who is vice-president, director,
stockholder, and depositor of a bank is such as will take out of the
statute his oral promise to indemnify a depositor against loss by reason
of the bank's insolvency.' 2 Neither of these cases refers to the other.
The court in the first case argues that there the promisor's interest is
no more personal and immediate than the interest of the landlord in
the success of his tenant's farming operations and cites Peele v. Powell."8
In that case the landlord promised to stand for supplies furnished his
tenant. In the action against the landlord on this promise a judgment
of nonsuit was affirmed on the ground that the oral promise was within
the statute of frauds. Wherever this case has been cited the fact gen-
erally 'has been overlooked that the court on a rehearing of the case
reversed its former ruling and held the facts sufficient to be submitted
to the jury.14 The case is therefore no authority for the proposition
that a landlord does not have sufficient interest in the successful opera-
tion of his farm by a tenant to take a promise to pay the tenant's debt
out of the statute of frauds. As a matter of fact the court has ex-
pressly held otherwise.1
The main purpose rule has its justification in the fact that when it
can be shown that the promisor has a personal and pecuniary interest
in the transaction, it is likely that the promise was in fact made. It is
obvious that the strict construction of the statute advocated by some
authorities'16 will make the statute an instrument for the perpetration of
" Gennett v. Lyerly, 207 N. C. 201, 176 S. E. 275 (1934).
' Garren v. Youngblood, 207 N. C. 86, 176 S. E. 252 (1934).
156 N. C. 553, 73 S. E. 234 (1911).
" Peele v. Powell, 161 N. C. 50, 76 S. E. 698 (1912).
1Whitehurst v. Padgett, 157 N. C. 424, 73 S. E. 240 (1911) ; Taylor v. Lee,
187 N. C. 393, 121 S. E. 659 (1924) ; Tarkinton v. Criffield, 188 N. C. 140, 124
S. E. 129 (1924).
"0In McCord v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 124 Wis. 509, 102 N. W. 334
(1905) the court said: "There are many dicta and some decisions indicating
that this result may be escaped if there is a new consideration for the guaranty,
or if such consideration consist of benefit to the guarantor. The statute, how-
ever, recognizes no such exception." Cf. Ames v. Foster, 106 Mass. 400 (1871) ;
Lang v. Henry, 54 N. H. 57 (1873) ; Muller v. Riviere, 59 Tex. 640 (1883). The
'main purpose rule does not apply in England: Harburg Comb Co. v. Martin,
(1902) 1 K. B. 778. The contention of this group seems to be that if the
promisor's promise is to pay the debt of another, it is within the statute regard-
less of the promisor's beneficial interest in the transaction; that if the promise
is in effect to pay the promisor's own debt, then it is immaterial that payment has
the incidental effect of extinguishing the liability of another. 1 BRAniff, SuRET-
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fraud rather than the prevention of it. The main purpose rule has an
important place in the North Carolina law of contract. It would indeed
be a surprise to the hundreds of merchants who extend credit to tenant
farmers on the landlord's promise to stand for the debt to learn that the
landlord was not responsible unless there was a writing evidencing his
promise. But if we are to retain the doctrine, it is submitted that there
should be an attempt to harmonize the decisions so as to prevent such
incompatible rulings as those presented by the two recent cases noted.
FRANKLIN T. DuPpEE, JR.
United States-Suits against the Government-
Cancellation of Air Mail Contracts.
In February, 1934, Postmaster General Farley cancelled government
mail contracts of three air transportation companies; and, under au-
thority from President Roosevelt, turned over the task of carrying the
air mail which the companies had been performing, to army planes
and pilots. One of these companies brought suit against Farley to
force the restoration by him of its cancelled contract. Held, bill dis-
missed for want of jurisdiction in a suit substantially one against the
United States.'
There are, in this and similar cases, three possible lines of procedure: (1)
The injured party may sue the official in a strictly personal action for
damages. This redress is open only in cases where the officer has com-
mitted a tort.2 Such as act must have been done without authority;
but apparent authority will not protect a defendant.3 (2) If Congress
has given its consent, the plaintiff may sue the United States.4 This has
generally been allowed only in cases on contract brought in the Court
of Claims.5 (3) Finally, as in the principal case, the aggrieved may
sue the officer in a quasi-private capacity and ask that the particular act
be restrained, or, in case of non-action, compelled.
In cases of this last type, granted that the official acted either (1)
without auliority, or (2) illegally, or (3) in an attempt to enforce an
sunp (3rd ed. 1905) §81; 1 Wn.LIsToN, CONTRACTS (1920 ed.) §470; Arnold, The
Main Purpose Rule and The Statute of Frauds (1924) 10 CoRN L. Q. 28; Fal-
conbridge, Guarantees and the Statute of Frauds (1919) 68 U. PA. L. R~v. 1.
I Transcontinental and Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Farley, 71 F. (2d) 288
(C. C. A. 2d, 1934) ; certiorari denied U. S. Supreme Court, Oct. 14, 1934.
Elliot v. Swartwout, 35 U. S. 137, 9 L. ed. 373 (1835).
Little v. Barreme, 6 U. S. 170, 2 L. ed. 243 (1804).
'U. S. ex rel. Levey v. Stockslager, 129 U. S. 470, 9 Sup. Ct. 382, 32 L. ed. 785
(1888) ; Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 3734 22 Sup. Ct. 650, 46 L. ed. 945
(1902) (Consent had been given).
'The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims is defined in 28 U. S. C. A. §250
(1928). It is said that the next move of the airlines will be to sue in this court.
U. S. News Weekly, Oct. 22, 1934, p. 14.
